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In consideration  of  the  size  and geographic  concentration  of proved  conventional  gas  reserves  and  the
potential  role  of  natural  gas  to reduce  the  carbon  intensity  of  energy  demand,  unconventional  gas
resources  have  become  increasingly  important  to  expand  natural  gas  supplies.  Shale gas  in  particular
has  gained  international  relevance  in  recent  years,  largely  due  to  its rapid  development  and  game-
changing  effects  in  the  United  States  and  its  wider  and  larger  distribution  worldwide  over  conventional
gas  reserves;  nonetheless,  developing  shale  gas  in other  countries  has  been  much  slower,  as  it presents
increased  risks  that  span  multiple  interlinked  dimensions  and  differ  across  the  perceptions  of  an ample
array  of stakeholders  in  diverse  contextual  settings.  The  premises  presented  in  this  paper  attempt  to
advance  a holistic  framework  for  shale  gas  development  which  comprises  several  factors  grouped  inovernance
anada
hina
exico
three  major  interlinked  domains:  access  to  natural  resources,  industry  capabilities  and governance.  To
empirically  test  its premises  under  contextual  variations,  the  framework  is further  used  to  consistently
analyze  the cases  of Canada,  China  and  Mexico.  Findings  conﬁrm  the  interdisciplinary  nature  of  shale
gas  development  and suggest  that  governance  is  the  most  critical  domain  to bring  about  changes  that
improve  the management  of  underlying  risks.
©  2016  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license. Introduction
The energy landscape has changed rapidly and drastically in the
ast decades. In addition to the robust growth of energy demand,
specially in developing countries, the rising importance of climate
hange has called for the use of fuels that emit less greenhouse
ases, in particular carbon dioxide. To meet these goals, one of
he major actions implemented in many countries consists of an
ncreased use of natural gas in the primary energy balance, as it
eads to lower carbon dioxide emissions over other fossil fuels
nd its use along with certain renewable energy sources fosters
n energy mix  less reliant on coal and oil and more supportive of
leaner technologies.
However, a larger natural gas supply in the world is currently
onstrained by the geographic concentration of proved reserves of
atural gas in a small number of countries and by the economic and
nergy security trade-offs resulting from the growing dependency
n imported supplies. In recent years, however, the outlook for nat-
ral gas markets was dramatically affected by the advent of gas
olumes produced in the United States at an unprecedentedly large
E-mail address: lozzano@ymail.com
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.05.014
214-6296/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article un(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
and rapid scale. These supplies are predominantly the result of shale
gas, or unconventional natural gas produced from shale formations,
which has transformed the economy of the United States and has
brought about several positive effects that include lower carbon
emissions, economic spillovers in local communities where devel-
opment of this resource is taking place, and energy security beneﬁts
manifest in the country’s emergence as an exporter of natural gas
in the form of liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG).
This experience in combination with preliminary geological
assessments [15,16] indicating a more extensive and abundant
global distribution of shale gas over current proved reserves of con-
ventional gas spurred avid interest across the world in the last ﬁve
years, with several countries embracing the potential development
of their own  shale gas resources. Nevertheless, considerable uncer-
tainty remains, particularly in Asia and Europe [5,55], and by the
end of 2015, shale gas production outside of the United States only
entered commercial stage in Argentina, Australia, Canada and China
[6]. In all these countries, shale gas was  produced at insufﬁcient low
growth rates and volumetric magnitudes to produce any positive
energy or economic effects, let alone to similar levels to the United
States.
To date, the study of shale gas development predominantly fol-
lows two  broad research lines. One strand centers on the analysis
of single countries [11,13,34,64], but the outcomes of these studies
der the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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re usually too speciﬁc and idiosyncratic to allow comparisons and
dentify common lessons and points of convergence among them.
iven the role of the United States as the earliest, the most suc-
essful and the best documented example of shale gas production
n the world, another major strand of research attempts to iden-
ify the underlying drivers of this experience that would facilitate
ts reproduction in other countries [55,58,60], notwithstanding the
rastically different settings in the other jurisdictions interested
n or already engaged in shale gas development. In consequence,
he study scope of worldwide shale gas development remains too
imited and fragmented, and a reconciliation of all these insights
nto a cohesive framework with validity beyond the United States
s notably absent from the academic literature.
This paper aims to unify these approaches by examining the
evelopment of shale gas from a more consistent perspective. In so
oing, this paper rests on the main premise that shale gas develop-
ent is fundamentally an interdisciplinary activity; for which, its
tudy must be inclusive, especially for comparative purposes. The
evelopment of this argument not only addresses the main topic of
his special issue, but also several of the key areas pointed out by
ovacool [50] in the ﬁeld of energy research and social sciences,
amely about the effects on energy systems from social, politi-
al and economic conﬁgurations, from institutions and non-state
ctors, and from diverse social groups and stakeholders.
Section 2 of this paper examines the multidimensional nature
f shale gas development and the challenges in devising a homoge-
eous view applicable worldwide, in order to propose in Section 3 a
ystemic and holistic approach in the form of a generic framework.
ection 4 tests the framework empirically through its application
n the brief analysis of shale gas development in Canada, China
nd Mexico, while Section 5 concludes with the main ﬁndings and
mplications.
. The multidimensionality of shale gas development
Shale gas is generally more complex and multifaceted to pro-
uce than conventional gas, and although the ﬁrst commercial
atural gas well drilled in the United States in 1821 was actually
 shale gas well [12], the technology and production methods at
he time could not make the extraction of shale gas economical,
articularly when compared with relatively inexpensive, easy-to-
xtract and abundant conventional gas. The advent of horizontal
rilling and hydraulic fracturing and their parallel deployment in
he 1980s ﬁnally helped to release the gas in the shale formations
n a cost-effective manner.
Despite these advances, shales show ample geological het-
rogeneity and a steeper declination rate, with shale gas wells
ypically exhausting more than half of their gas output in the
rst few years [10]; additionally, the quality and quantity of shale
esources inferred in resource assessments and the exact loca-
ion of the zones with the highest productivity (‘sweet spots’) or
icher content in liquids of higher economic value remain uncer-
ain until actual exploratory drilling occurs [7]. In order to maintain
r increase gas production levels cost-effectively, developers must
rill and hydraulically fracture a larger number of wells over
horter lead times, which exceeds the amount of technology inputs,
ater, chemicals, surface facilities and human resources typically
bserved in conventional gas production, demanding in turn the
reation of agile supply chains formed with external suppliers of
pecialized services [20]. In sum, because of this proﬁle, early shale
as development generally presents more intricate technical and
perational challenges, with higher economic costs and lower prof-
tability margins [2,5].
More relevant, a faster pace and larger scale of development
mpliﬁes land, water and environmental impacts, and even though Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72
some of these impacts are common with conventional gas devel-
opment, what makes shale gas distinctive is that the intensity,
magnitude and extent of its operations pose cumulative risks with
effects still not fully understood that are insufﬁciently addressed by
conventional risk management and regulatory approaches [18,62].
Performed at a large scale as in shale gas production, even a long-
established industry practice like hydraulic fracturing creates a
non-point source effect whereby the density and length in the rock
fractures complicates the accurate traceability and assignment of
liabilities to incumbent operators in case of groundwater pollution
[24]. Furthermore, shale resources are more widely dispersed, for
which development stretches over more extensive areas and tends
to take place in proximity to communities with high population
densities that had little to no previous involvement in equivalent
activities. These issues increase social tensions and the potential to
result in conﬂicts.
Compared with conventional gas, the risks derived from shale
gas development span quantity and quality issues in groundwater
and surface aquifers, including those apt for human use; emis-
sions of toxic pollutants and greenhouse gases (most noticeably
methane) that affect overall air quality; induced seismicity; ecolog-
ical damage to natural habitats and wildlife; occupational hazards
for workers and personnel adjacent to production sites; public
health effects; and impacts to community life from the increased
noise, dust and road trafﬁc generated by ongoing operations. Other
negative externalities refer to boom-and-bust cycles, and losses in
the quality of life, property value and visual aesthetics [22,47,62].
In essence, shale gas development transcends purely techni-
cal and economic domains, to interweave environmental, social,
and political risks that interlink a larger number of stakeholders.
Therefore, to sever any of these links from shale gas development
renders incomplete the prism of risks and stakeholders involved,
which has deleterious effects, especially for comparative, strategy-
making and policy-making purposes. In spite of this, the academic
discussion about shale gas development largely centers on speciﬁc
attributes that only capture part of these risks, overlooking several
relevant domains and their corresponding interrelations. A study
of the academic literature devoted to shale gas between 1990 and
2014 conﬁrms that most research has been highly concentrated on
engineering, technical and geological subjects [59].
In line with these arguments, scholars have stressed the need for
a multidisciplinary approach different from that applicable to con-
ventional gas, in order to overcome the multiple challenges and
risks associated with shale gas development [2,47] and favor the
shift of energy research from a few speciﬁc domains towards a more
inclusive problem-based approach [51]. In addition to this frag-
mented scope, the majority of academic studies, including those
attempting to identify the major forces behind shale gas develop-
ment [1,5,58,60,53] are usually restricted to the discussion of single
countries, which has further contributed to hamper the applicabil-
ity of their ﬁndings to other settings.
In particular, deliberately or tacitly, the United States became
the reference for shale gas development around the world. Delib-
erately, the United States federal government formally launched
in 2010 its ‘Global Shale Gas Initiative’ to provide help to coun-
tries looking forward to developing their own unconventional gas
resources for energy security and environmental reasons [43]. Tac-
itly, the pioneering experience of the United States became a role
model in countries like Mexico [33] and the United Kingdom [22].
Empirical evidence however, has demonstrated the increas-
ing difﬁculty in making shale gas production commercially viable
beyond the United States. Despite the early positive expectations
about shale gas, the experiences in the last few years in a num-
ber of countries with signiﬁcant inferred volumes of shale gas have
yielded poor results and have presented more considerable risks
than conventional gas production. Examples of challenges spanning
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ultiple dimensions include Argentina [34], China [26,57], Mexico
13,33], Poland [28] and the United Kingdom [11,22]. These experi-
nces have also questioned the use of the United States experience
s a ‘template’ or ‘benchmark’ of shale gas development success,
iven the structural and contextual divergences throughout the
orld. In Europe, several countries had embraced the replication of
he successful shale gas ‘revolution’ in the United States as a means
o reduce their dependence on Russian pipeline gas imports, yet as
oon as they faced the challenges involved in such task, many of
hem pulled out indeﬁnitely from their strategy to develop their
nconventional gas resources [25,55].
To begin with, one of the most distinctive characteristics in
he United States refers to the private ownership of petroleum
ights, which has helped reduce the social tension produced by
hale gas development through the economic incentives that many
andowners perceive [53,60] but which is highly unlikely to be
eplicated, given the predominance of state-owned rights in most
ther jurisdictions worldwide. Secondly, the United States shale
as boom is far from being a spontaneous occurrence, as it is the
esult of economic incentives, industry capabilities and extensive
nfrastructure systems developed over long timespans and under
ifferent institutional arrangements [1,58]. Lastly, due to the diver-
ity of legal, regulatory arrangements, policy priorities at different
overnment levels and the social questionability and evolution of
ertain environmental practices across jurisdictions, there are no
niform shale gas pathways from which to portray a single model
bsolutely representative of the United States [9].
Besides, scholars have noted an intrinsic ﬂaw in the natural use
f the United States as an ‘international benchmark’ of shale gas
evelopment, insofar as the adaptability of such benchmark and its
erived aspirational goals are poor in countries with fairly differ-
nt settings [33,38]. This is also consistent with some views that
laim shale gas production to be an overly exaggerated or ‘hyped’
henomenon, since it is largely limited to the United States due
o the unique characteristics of that country and the timing of
avorable external events to foster such a large scale of production
30,58]. These considerations suggest that there is no one-size-ﬁts-
ll approach for the development of shale gas resources, and lead
he academic discussion to question whether this activity is unique
nough in every case to prevent the use of any reference based on
ommon attributes [36].
Interestingly enough, more than two decades ago, in light of
he works at the time in the United States towards the commercial
evelopment of different types of unconventional gas resources,
ot only was that country suggested as the most likely pioneer of
hale gas production, but particularly as a source of learning for
ther countries to follow suit [36]. In this sense, this paper adheres
o the argument that valuable knowledge can be assimilated from
he examination of the United States and of those countries at an
arly stage of commercial shale gas development, albeit not in the
orm of a rigid template but as a knowledge source to design trans-
erable policies [33,38] and illustrate actual negative examples and
ajor risks to avoid in the development of shale gas for other set-
ings [9,22]. The following section strives to condense these notions
nto a cohesive systemic framework.
. Introducing a generic perspective for shale gas
evelopment
The design of a single approach to shale gas development is not a
traightforward task, as it involves differing, and sometimes oppos-
ng views between major stakeholders that include the oil and gas
ndustry, the government, local communities, non-governmental
rganizations (NGOs) and the general public. Contextual settings at Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72 65
a country or regional level are likely to inﬂuence a richer diversity
of subgroups and interests within these major stakeholders.
Prior efforts to reﬂect the interdisciplinary nature of shale gas
development for comparative purposes fell short in capturing this
complexity. These attempts include a SWOT analysis on China’s
experience [63] that blurred the distinction between the macro
and micro levels of analysis and between the perspectives of the
diverse stakeholders embedded; similarly, a robust approximation
to potential risks was  presented by Wiseman [62], nevertheless,
it was based on and applied only to particular jurisdictions in the
United States.
The framework presented in this section strives to provide
a multidisciplinary and more consistent perspective following
the main assumption that the pace and magnitude of shale gas
development will vary across countries and possibly between the
jurisdictions within them [6,21]. This statement aligns with other
views underscoring that shale gas development will tend to diverge
as it is inﬂuenced by different considerations, especially of polit-
ical nature [5], and includes the values of different stakeholders
in response to their perception on the distribution of beneﬁts and
risks [49]. The overarching premise is that scarce as they are, energy
issues are fundamentally entrenched in an indissoluble nexus with
multiple dimensions that in turn, exert asymmetrical inﬂuence
over diverse stakeholders and settings and occur at different spatial
and physical scales [4,19].
Therefore, shale gas is not exclusively a geophysical, technical
or economic endeavor, but a set of higher interrelated multidimen-
sional constructs that contingent on their context, reﬂect a political
position concerning shale gas resources, involve the industry pro-
ﬁciency to develop those resources, and affect the perceptions and
the formal and informal relationships of the actors involved. These
three domains are respectively denoted in the framework as Access
to Natural Resources; Industry Capabilities, and Governance.
These arguments use and reﬁne the guidelines of the ‘RIG’
model presented in APERC [6], through the support of an extensive
literature review and case studies that included semi-structured
interviews with industry experts and government ofﬁcers vis-
ited in Mexico City, Mexico; Alberta, Canada; and Pennsylvania,
United States during June 2014. The insights about global shale gas
development condensed in this framework also beneﬁted from the
author’s participation in several international academic and insti-
tutional events on the subject held during 2013 and 2014 and from
his visit to several communities affected by shale gas activities in
Denton City and across the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas in February
2016. This framework elaborates on the principles of an integral
petroleum resource management system posited by Al-Kasim [3],
with the addition of the concept of governance from the arguments
that emphasize its role as a vehicle to support more effective out-
comes in the development of natural resources among the different
stakeholders involved and their respective interests [4,52]. In this
framework, governance is conceived as the distribution of author-
ity between state and non-state actors at multiple parallel levels
[4,48].
The framework assumes a systemic relationship whereby its
three major domains are interdependent and necessary for shale
gas development, but among them governance comprises the ele-
ments that signiﬁcantly affect the incentives in the interactions of
the diverse stakeholders involved, which in turn affects the other
two domains. According to this assumption, governance issues
are then expected to inﬂuence the industry capabilities and cred-
ibility, to affect operations and recovery factors in the shale gas
resource base, including the subset of resources with potential to
be produced on a commercial scale. This inﬂuence on the industry’s
capabilities and the resource base has the potential to inﬂuence the
conditions and extent of the access to shale resources and also to
feed back into the social response and the political position towards
66 J.R. Lozano-Maya / Energy Research & Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72
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hale gas in the governance domain, either in the vein of a ‘virtuous
ycle’ of interlinked positive effects leading to improved opera-
ions, enhanced recovery factors increased participation and social
rust [32] or as a ‘vicious cycle’ that undermines the authority and
xpectations of stakeholders to prevent reciprocal agreements and
pur radically opposing stances. Fundamentally, the factors in this
omain converge with the position that shale gas can bring overall
ositive beneﬁts if done responsibly through adequate governance
echanisms [5,27,52].
The design aims to make the framework widely applicable,
hile also keeping it sufﬁciently detailed to have an insightful
nalysis in which the relevant issues for a particular context ﬁt
n. Owing that the three major domains in the framework could
e largely applicable to other type of energy and even non-energy
ndertakings, their subdivision into ﬁner factors helps to account
or contextual granularity speciﬁc to shale gas development. As the
ultiple risks of shale gas development are systemically linked
ith each other, the three domains in the framework inﬂuence
nd overlap each other, for which their respective factors may
ot be totally discrete, spanning more than one of these domains.
s described in more detail below, a main premise in the frame-
ork is that a dynamic process permeates across its three domains
hereby stakeholders perceive risks and react differently, depend-
ng on their set of values, information and expectations; their
patial, geographical and institutional context; and the iteration
nd evolution of their interactions over time [37,56].
It must be stressed that the framework is comprehensive but
ot exhaustive, which implies that it cannot include every possible
lement involved in the development of shale gas, for which some
evel of abstraction is inevitably necessary. Likewise, the framework
nly comprises those elements concerning shale gas developmentess shale gas development.
which a country can fairly inﬂuence or modify; in consequence,
external variables such as geopolitical events or international price
ﬂuctuations lie beyond its scope, notwithstanding their relevance
and inﬂuence. In addition, although the framework outlines the
potential risks and interdisciplinary considerations in a broad array
of contextual settings, its objective is to provide a consistent and
holistic view of shale gas development, not to promote it. For the
sake of clarity, Fig. 1 depicts a visual representation of this tripar-
tite framework with its overlapping dimensions. The subsections
below describe the interactions and ﬁner factors in the tripartite
framework.
3.1. Access to natural resources
The founding domain of the framework refers to the access to
natural resources, which includes (i) the shale gas resources to
be extracted, along with the (ii) water resources required to per-
form the required methods to produce the gas economically from
the shale formations. In line with the multidisciplinary approach
embedded in the framework, this notion of access transcends geo-
physical, technical and economic constraints to emphasize the legal
right to extract shale and water resources, including the degree
of control and the extent of access embedded [38]. This access is
largely dependent on the political and institutional trade-offs in
the governance domain described below.
This is a fundamental consideration, inasmuch as the existence
of shale gas resources is a necessary, but not sufﬁcient condition
to their development whenever there are blanket restrictions to
their extraction. Legal access explains why  countries presumed to
have a large shale gas potential such as France has declined to pur-
sue the development of those resources due to legal restrictions.
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hese restrictions might be indirect, imposed on the use of water
esources or on the deployment of certain production methods such
s hydraulic fracturing. Thus, access to natural resources will vary
n every country and even within the internal jurisdictions in a sin-
le country, largely because of political considerations; however,
he framework acknowledges four essential preconditions to allow
he development of shale resources.
These preconditions refer to (a) market demand, whether inter-
al or external, to absorb the potential incremental gas supply;
b) a minimal price level at which massive shale gas production
ould become proﬁtable and (c) access to capital, necessary to
und the activities associated, whether in the form of ﬁnancial
arkets in free-market economies, public investments prevalent
n command-driven economies or a combination of both. Another
recondition refers to (d) governmental support in the form of sub-
idies, research programs, more accurate and publicly accessible
eologic information or other incentives. On this last precondi-
ion, subsidies and incentives are deemed necessary to support the
ntroduction of technologies widely available but not yet fully com-
ercial for a certain geographic reach, at least until they reach a
cale-up stage [54] and gain acceptance at the political, social and
ndustry levels [30].
.2. Industry capabilities
The proﬁtability of companies producing shale gas hinges
n their strategies to enhance knowledge, ﬂexibility and cost-
fﬁciency capabilities, to leverage the linkages with other external
roviders, and to effectively mitigate potential environmental and
ocial risks in anticipation of the uncertain changes in the oil and
as markets. These characteristics are fairly reminiscent of the
oncept of ‘dynamic capabilities’ which ﬁrms deploys in order to
ense their environment, seize potential business opportunities
nd adapt themselves adequately and timely to remain competitive
46].
The complexity embedded in the development of shale gas is
alling for a new business model that demands more sophisti-
ated technical and organizational capabilities with technological
rowess, increased ﬂexibility, cost-efﬁciency and competitiveness
7], especially under the recent period of continued low oil (and gas)
rices. Industry capabilities thus determine the adaptability and
otential timespans associated in the activity of producing shale
as. In some contexts, a legacy oil and gas industry will represent
n advantage in terms of the existing wealth of human and phys-
cal assets that might be better adapted to the task of shale gas
roduction, contingent on the quality and quantity of those assets
nd their experience in the commercial production of other type of
nconventional gas resources or even in early stages of shale gas
evelopment.
In step with the critical role that technological applications and
apabilities play in the production of shale gas [2,7], the indus-
ry capabilities domain encompasses four speciﬁc factors: (i) the
ndustry’s technological and operational capabilities, including an
dequate workforce in terms of size and skills and the presence of
nternational oil and gas companies with previous experience in the
roduction of shale gas; (ii) the availability of providers of special-
zed oilﬁeld services and equipment; (iii) sufﬁcient infrastructure
ecessary to produce, process, store and transport the gas produced
p to the markets; and (iv) the adherence to practices, including
ndustry standards, to minimize the risks to industrial safety, to the
nvironment and to local communities, in order to affect the way
n which the general public perceives shale-gas-related operations.Beyond economic criteria, the factors in this domain acknowl-
dge that oil and gas ﬁrms looking for a sustained competitive
dvantage must legitimate their operations through a genuine
ommitment that balances their commercial proﬁtability with the Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72 67
interests, perceptions and expectations from other stakeholders, in
what is generally known as a ‘social license’ [41]. In line with the
framework’s premises, energy technology and infrastructure are
conceived as socio-technical systems that involve, depend on, and
evolve with the socio-economic context and the interests of the
different stakeholders involved [30,47]. This means that potential
technology progress allowing the eventual abandonment or reduc-
tion in the use of water, a necessary- and controversial-input in the
development of shale gas, would certainly also affect the associ-
ated perceptions of risk and acceptance among stakeholders. These
social perceptions pertain as well to the next domain.
3.3. Governance
The governance domain in the framework concerns the way in
which different state and non-state stakeholders involved in the
development of shale gas articulate their interactions and rela-
tionships based on their interests, expectations, beneﬁts and risks
over time and across contextual situations. Governance is critical
because at heart, shale gas development is a political undertaking
and creates asymmetrical beneﬁts and risks in different spatial and
temporal scales, leading to disputes among stakeholders which are
guided by their respective ‘narratives’ or ‘storylines’, since facts and
data are no longer relevant for them owing to their divergences in
values, beneﬁts, risk perceptions and reciprocal trust [8,23,37].
Accordingly, the governance domain encompasses three fac-
tors: (i) the political frames and their narratives regarding shale
gas development at different levels; (ii) the institutional structure
including the arrangements between owners and developers of
shale gas, applicable regulations and legal issues; and (iii) a multi-
stakeholder engagement. Implicit in this domain is a fair degree
of political stability allowing polycentric governance, whereby the
participation of empowered local communities in the manage-
ment of natural resources is more appropriate due to their better
knowledge of social and environmental risks and the government’s
ineffectiveness to act on behalf of the public interest due to moral,
informational or intellectual reasons [40].
The ﬁrst factor alludes to the position or frame of meaning
devised by major stakeholder groups to help their own positions
on shale gas dominate the public opinion for policy-making pur-
poses. Because shale gas interlinks several scales of action (national,
regional, local), plausible beneﬁts and risks are perceived dif-
ferently, producing mixed societal responses and irreconcilable
conﬂicts that push stakeholders not to look for a rational dialogue,
but rather to create their own  views of what shale gas development
is about, in order to impose those views with the aid of coali-
tions formed with other like-minded actors [11,23,49]. The aim
evidently, is to increase the discursive dominance of these parti-
san views by creating compelling narratives that encourage large
audiences to interpret shale gas development in just the same way.
To be successful, these narratives seek to connect to their audi-
ence values by building storylines that underpin certain arguments
through selective meanings, evidences and sense of urgency, to
be then delivered by trustworthy actors [37,61]. These narratives
are usually antagonistic, conceiving on one hand shale gas as an
‘opportunity’ to bring beneﬁts like energy security, reduced carbon
emissions and economic growth, with typical supporters being the
industry, governments and media. On the other hand, there are
narratives of shale gas as a ‘threat’, which leverage the negative
impacts on public health and the environment, mostly at the local
level, although at a broader scale, they also argue that shale gas
development locks-in economies into a higher use of gas that hin-
ders the opportunities to expand renewable energy and introduce
low-carbon energy systems. Typical supporters of this narrative
include local communities, NGOs, the renewable energy industry
and media [8]. Recent empirical research stresses for instance, that
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ontexts with prior oil and gas activities seem to be more favorable
o the development of shale gas [61] and that a dominant indus-
ry voice in shale gas development, makes regulation lag behind
18]. Irrespective of the tone supported, a shale gas narrative is
losely connected to the political position underlying the access to
hale and water resources, which further reﬂects the cross-linkages
mong the framework’s domains.
The second governance factor recognizes the different risks of
hale gas over conventional gas in terms of the incumbent insti-
utional arrangement rooted in a set of geophysical, economic,
nvironmental, legal and social trade-offs that affect the distri-
ution of costs and beneﬁts [4]. This second factor includes the
onsiderations that articulate the relationships between owners
nd developers of shale gas resources, as manifest in legal rights
nd ﬁscal regimes [38] along with the regulatory approaches to
cknowledge and avoid the cumulative effects in several dimen-
ions areas, most noticeably environmental [47].
The third and last domain factor refers to a permanent multi-
takeholder engagement that includes the efforts by shale gas
ompanies to interact with local communities and inﬂuence their
erceptions to gain (or lose) social acceptance. Also included are
he governmental efforts to involve other stakeholders in the gov-
rnance of shale gas development. Again, as per the framework’s
remises, these factors have strong links with others in the industry
apabilities and access to natural resources domains.
Local communities are becoming more relevant in the
overnance of shale gas development, demanding meaningful
nformation, decision-making and beneﬁts; likewise, developing
ompanies are increasingly aware of the favorable role that early
ocial licenses gained through legitimacy, credibility and trust have
n the mitigation of the business risks that social conﬂicts pose
o operations, including delays and eventual project cancellations
11,41]. For governments, multistakeholder engagement in energy
rojects improves decision-making and risks mitigation in a more
ntegrated and equitable manner [41,48] but demands in turn the
overnmental ability to empower those stakeholders and better
anage of their expectations about risks, developers, processes
nd beneﬁts [56]. A more inclusive governance of shale gas devel-
pment, especially involving those whose voice is less likely to
e heard, helps governments stay away from partisan narratives
o strengthen their own political autonomy and credibility, and
ltimately, avoid the ‘coalmine canary effect’ whereby unfulﬁlled
ocial demands and excluded local communities will ﬁrst impact a
educed number of local actors but eventually will expand and cre-
te much stronger social and environmental effects with broader
mplications (Willow, 2010 cited in Ref. [18]).
. Case studies
In line with the notions on the multidisciplinary nature of shale
as development and the need to design a more consistent view
f this activity across the world, this section presents three brief
ountry cases analyzed with the framework presented in the pre-
ious section. The ﬁrst criterion used to select Canada, China and
exico as case studies referred to the inferred existence of shale
as resources in all of them as per EIA [16], the relative size of
hose volumes over the remaining countries assessed, as well as
vidences of early shale gas development. To enhance the com-
arative analysis, the selection of Canada and Mexico responded
o the assessment of countries within a single geographical region
North America), especially against their neighboring exemplar the
nited States. Canada and China were also selected as they repre-
ent some of the most advanced experiences of commercial shale
as production beyond the United States. Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72
4.1. Canada
4.1.1. Access to natural resources
Canada has huge shale gas resources that put it at the fourth
largest place worldwide [16], but because of the primary legal pow-
ers vested in the Canadian provinces, oil and gas issues differ across
the country. Thus, this brief analysis centers on the western Cana-
dian provinces of Alberta and British Columbia where shale and
water resources have been accessible thus far under the competi-
tive premises of a free market.
As for the preconditions to this domain, despite the continued
low market prices since late 2014, commercial shale gas devel-
opment has been underway in these provinces leveraging robust
ﬁnancial and capital markets, with province governmental sup-
port that encompasses incentives embedded in the royalty regime,
as well as repositories that by legal mandate provide open access
to an exhaustive inventory of geological samples collected across
the provinces over decades, from nearly every well ever drilled
[6]. Market demand is weak, however. The United States became
the most important market for Canadian gas and the only one for
exports, providing stable growth for decades, but due to the rising
self-sufﬁciency of that country, Canadian natural gas production,
especially of shale gas, greatly depends on ﬁnding other export
markets overseas [35].
4.1.2. Industry capabilities
In these western Canadian provinces there is a long-established
oil and gas industry that grew in deep integration with the United
States market and which is also experienced in the production
of other unconventional gas resources such as coalbed methane,
tight gas and shale gas, that have rested on sufﬁcient experi-
enced personnel and oilﬁeld service providers [42]. Infrastructure
faces certain gaps concerning the age of some pipelines, but espe-
cially on the lack of lateral transport systems that connect these
provinces with the rest of Canada, mostly due to the traditional
focus on north-to-south gas transport ﬂows from Canada to the
United States [35]. In terms of the adherence to practices, indus-
try associations and operators have progressively become more
aware of environmental impacts, although the discussion of the
full risks embedded continues, as supported by different levels of
government, universities and research bodies [42,47].
4.1.3. Governance
While some Canadian provinces do not allow shale gas devel-
opment and have current legal bans, the political position in the
provincial governments of Alberta and British Columbia is clearly
favorable to the development of shale gas. The signiﬁcance of the oil
and gas industry in the province economies in combination with the
competitiveness between upstream gas projects on a global scale
has tied provincial governments to offer attractive conditions for
developers with the aim of keeping them operating in their juris-
dictions, much at the expense of a powerful narrative stressing the
macro-level beneﬁts of shale gas development and providing ded-
icated ﬁscal measures to this activity contingent on the age, type
and output of each well [18]. Given the institutional arrangement
between the different levels of government, the oil and gas industry
and its signiﬁcance in the economic activity, and the rights granted
to aboriginal groups like the First Nations, social and environmental
risks are major concerns in shale gas development. In this regard,
the legacy of oil and gas production in Alberta and British Columbia
provided a wide scope of regulations; nevertheless, management
of shale gas development risks is not comprehensive, and although
speciﬁc regulations are in progress, studies suggest that the man-
agement of risks substantially lags behind actual projects, that
enforcement and monitoring are loose, and that despite the con-
sultation processes established in these regulations, many projects
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tarted operations without the prior feedback of local communities
o identify critical risks [42,45].
Due to these issues, communities and aboriginal groups in par-
icular, perceive their engagement in consultations as superﬂuous,
egulations as not enough demanding of the industry, and their
emands and concerns as overlooked by authorities and regula-
ors, who are increasingly sensed as deliberately favoring shale
as on the fear of losing the investments associated, much to the
xpense of social welfare [45]. More important, these issues have
esulted in a serious distrust in the government which has triggered
 proactive shift of decision-making whereby local First Nations
roups in British Columbia are bypassing authorities to inform their
oncerns and negotiate current projects directly with developers,
ho in turn have responded favorably in their interest of secur-
ng a social license [18]. If not addressed efﬁciently, governance
ssues, could greatly block the advance of shale gas production in
estern Canada. What is more important is that these incidents
eem to have eroded the credibility of the provincial governments
nd have prompted an emergent governance of shale gas develop-
ent in which aboriginal groups are empowered and have shaped
egulation proactively in the face of the regulatory gaps and inef-
ectiveness perceived.
.2. China
.2.1. Access to natural resources
China has the largest inferred resource base of shale gas in the
orld [16] and manifested its interest in shale gas from 2009. After
igniﬁcant technical and ﬁnancial efforts, by the end of 2013, the
uling ﬁeld in southeastern Sichuan Basin entered the commercial
tage of production [6]. A centralized economy, the majority of oil
nd gas operations in China are held by a few dominant national oil
ompanies; however, in light of the complexity to produce shale
as at a large scale, the Chinese government has thus far conducted
wo tenders for the exploration of several shale gas blocks which
ere granted to Chinese private and state companies; and it has
llowed a modest participation of international oil companies that
nclude Shell from 2012 and BP from March 2016 to participate
n the development of shale resources [14,39]. Currently, there is
ccess to water resources for shale gas extraction, although many
hinese shale basins are located in arid and semi-arid regions with
igh water stress levels, and even in those regions with relatively
ore abundant water resources like the Sichuan basin, other com-
eting human and agriculture needs pose a major risk to a larger
cale of shale gas production [26].
Regarding the framework’s preconditions to access these nat-
ral resources, energy sustainability and energy security reasons
ustain a growing demand of natural gas and the efforts to increase
omestic gas supplies. Funding of these projects is present mainly
hrough the capital of Chinese development agencies and state-
wned oil and gas companies, and producers enjoy a progressively
ecreasing subsidy to help them with the proﬁtability of their oper-
tions [26]. The Chinese government has been fully supportive of
hale gas through a broad array of initiatives that besides produc-
ion subsidies have included ambitious production targets, research
nd development programs, special mineral status to shale gas, and
nternational cooperation strategies to accelerate the production of
hese resources [54,64].
.2.2. Industry capabilities
The Chinese gas industry is evolving to harness the technical
hallenges of shale formations, but to a large extent, it lacks the
echnological and operational capabilities to substantially increase
he pace of production, in consideration of the drastically different
eological properties of the Chinese shale formations against those
n North America where current technologies were successfully Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72 69
proven [54]. Furthermore, none of the winners of the shale tenders
had previous experience developing these resources [14]; and the
combination of bold production targets with incipient regulations
does not help to effectively manage the safety and environmental
risks associated [29].
The Chinese industry is basically dominated by three vertically
integrated national oil companies (CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec) that
hold most of the shale acreage and concentrate the capital, work-
force, technology and infrastructure. In the practice, this impedes
operators without ties to these three major owned companies
from using common infrastructure like pipelines and prevents a
richer technological exchange; by the end of 2012, state-owned
companies held more than 85% of the Chinese oilﬁeld services
market, with international companies accounting for less than
5% [57]. Additionally, with the exception of Sichuan, the exten-
sion of China’s gas pipeline network does not effectively connect
potential shale producing basins and markets [21]. Adding up to
this complexity, China’s legacy oil and gas industry stretched into
the production of other unconventional gas resources like coalbed
methane since the late 1990s; however, production is still low,
mostly because of several remaining challenges very similar to
those of shale gas [63].
4.2.3. Governance
The central government’s power and its omnipresence in the
industry back the leading narrative to produce shale gas massively.
China’s rising energy needs and current coal use at approximately
two-thirds of its primary energy supply have prompted a strategy
to expand the use of natural gas, with the increased production of
domestic gas resources being set to reduce its reliance on exter-
nal supplies. Because of this, shale gas has become a priority in the
governmental agenda, aided by the top-down nature of the Chi-
nese institutional system and its authoritarian politics [57]. This
shale gas narrative puts economic drivers ahead of environmental
concerns, and has led the Chinese government to grant shale gas
special ‘independent mineral’ status in 2011 in order to provide
stronger economic support and foster the participation of private
capital that rushes large-scale production [21,26]. China’s institu-
tional arrangement is also multi-layered, with numerous agencies
overlapping or bypassing others at different administrative levels
and blurring the distribution of risks and beneﬁts among stake-
holders, with central-made legislations that must be enforced by
the provinces, which in turn greatly depend on the revenue and
employment provided by national oil companies owned by the
central government. This results in regulatory ambiguity which
in combination with the lack of transparency in all the govern-
ment levels leads to environmental risks being greatly overlooked,
but most notably, stakeholder engagement, happens if at all, only
when projects are operating and when environmental impacts are
most likely to have occurred [21]. Along with this lack of mean-
ingful engagement, some social protests were reported over the
nuisances and environmental effects of the shale gas activity in
Sichuan [14,29] and could grow if unattended.
4.3. Mexico
4.3.1. Access to natural resources
Mexico’s potential shale gas resources are considered the sixth
largest in the world, with formations that are shared with the
United States [16]. Mexico is a remarkable example of access to
shale resources and energy as a whole. For more than 75 years,
the Mexican oil and gas industry remained strictly closed to nearly
every form of private investment, carrying out all the activities in
the oil and gas value chain exclusively through its monopolistic
national oil company Pemex, but in 2013 an overhauling energy
reform granted private operators legal access to produce oil and gas
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long with Pemex, including the eventual development of shale gas
esources through competitive tenders [38]. There is legal access to
ater resources to perform hydraulic fracturing, although Mexico’s
ortheastern territory, where most shale gas activities are taking
lace, is arid and prone to droughts [33].
.3.2. Industry capabilities
Mostly because of its long-lasting monopolistic structure,
exico’s oil and gas sector suffered from chronic underinvest-
ent, overstafﬁng and ﬁnancial pressures that seriously eroded the
ndustry’s capabilities and infrastructure, more so for the eventual
evelopment of unconventional resources like shale gas. Serious
nfrastructure bottlenecks like the 22 ‘critical alerts’ in 2012 that
sked consumers to curtail their natural gas consumption due to the
aturated capacity in the main transmission pipelines [13] blocked
n expanded use of gas, and although they triggered new pipeline
rojects, these will take some years more to come online.
.3.3. Governance
Mexico’s federal government built an ofﬁcial narrative that not
nly supported shale gas development but also, at a broader level,
ts overhauling 2013 energy reform. Aided by heavy media cov-
rage, this narrative was notorious because the administration
t the time touted the economic prosperity and game-changing
ffects from embarking on shale gas development, nearly taking
or granted that once reforms were passed, Mexico would follow
uit the shale gas experience of the United States, without any
rior consideration of potential risks [13,33]. Shale gas activities
ed by Pemex commenced in 2010, and despite originally ambitious
lans and the presence of international and domestic oilﬁeld ser-
ice companies in Mexico, by the end of 2014 only 17 shale wells
ad been drilled, most of them with mixed performance results
6]. Furthermore, by the end of 2015 no tenders had been yet con-
ucted and in May  2016 it was announced that the unconventional
esources (including shale gas) tender scheduled for that same year
as further postponed, on the grounds of low oil prices and speciﬁc
egulations still in progress [17].
In this regard, no ﬁscal regime speciﬁc to shale gas exists in
exico as tenders have not yet occurred, although the new legal
nstruments provides an economic incentive in the form of a royalty
xemption for non-associated natural gas whenever prices remain
nder USD 5 per million BTU [38]. Mexico’s evolving regulations in
hale gas development demand the institutional ability to enforce
hem effectively through a number of incumbent federal agencies
hat were created as a system of check and balances to increase
ransparency and avoid the deeply embedded corruption history
n the oil and gas sector [31].
In Mexico, petroleum rights belong to the federation, for which
tates and local communities get no more beneﬁts than economic
pillovers. With the reform passed, the law now considers a small
conomic retribution to landowners from developers, but in paral-
el it grants oil and gas activities the highest priority over other
and uses, which in the practice forces landowners to monetize
heir potential risks [6]. Although public consultation processes for
il and gas projects were also included in the laws, their impor-
ance is relegated, and social demonstrations could increase under
 scenario of larger production, especially as tenders and actual
evelopment are further delayed and NGOs and local communities
ain time to strengthen their actions and arguments to change the
urrent governance and offset the government’s narrative. Last but
ot least, key to sound shale gas governance is political stability,
ut organized crime activities, especially in the northeast Mexican
erritory where exploratory shale occurs [44], threaten the other
ey factors that support shale gas development, especially in the
ndustry capabilities domain. Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72
5. Conclusions and implications
Largely inspired by the game-changing experience of the United
States and by the promise of sustaining larger gas consumption
with expanded domestic supplies, many countries have pursued
the development of shale gas, with modest results at best in few
of them. As the academic study of shale gas development has
either centered on speciﬁc dimensions for certain countries or on
the experience on the United States, there is a fragmented scope
that overlooks spatial and contextual variations and the interdisci-
plinary nature embedded in this activity.
In an analogy with a prism, the numerous risks underlying shale
gas development are further ampliﬁed by the interrelations and
perceptions of the different stakeholders involved, for which this
paper proposed a holistic study in the form of a tripartite frame-
work that condenses the systemic relationships of different factors
pertaining to the domains of access to natural resources, indus-
try capabilities and governance. The arguments in the framework
converge with the position that the risks of shale gas development
vary across actors, spaces, times and context; therefore, this activ-
ity entails diverse trade-offs that accommodate certain narratives,
for which it is essentially a political undertaking.
While access and industry proﬁciency are fundamental to
extract the gas from shale formations, it is governance, and par-
ticularly a multi-level inclusive governance, which is likely to
signiﬁcantly affect the incentives that bring about mutually beneﬁ-
cial outcomes for the stakeholders involved, which in turn affect the
other two  domains. This is critical since empirical experiences illus-
trate that whenever a narrative is imposed on those stakeholders
who do not receive direct beneﬁts but endure the risks, states can
undermine their political autonomy and credibility and stir more
antagonist positions. More important, in their narrative to deliber-
ately favor shale gas in exchange for overall economic beneﬁts at
the expense of more vulnerable social groups, governments may  fall
prey of the ‘coalmine canary’ effect, undermining the risks involved
and triggering much larger social and environmental impacts once
shale gas development advances.
The decision to undertake the development of shale resources is
in the end contingent on the particular actors, interactions and con-
text involved, meaning that depending on the circumstances, the
best collective decision may  be not to undertake shale gas devel-
opment at all, at least until there is a balanced, inclusive approach
that results in the creation of economic opportunities while still
protecting the land, environment and rights of local communi-
ties. In regions where shale gas is being produced commercially
like western Canada, the dominant narrative imposed by provincial
governments is showing that local and aboriginal communities are
losing trust in regulators and empowering themselves as effective
interlocutors with the industry, shaping regulations proactively. In
China and Mexico, social and environmental issues could spur sim-
ilar dynamics, especially if a unilateral narrative is not willing to
listen to other voices.
Nevertheless, whenever shale gas development is pursued, the
framework concurs with the position that it must bring net pos-
itive beneﬁts to all stakeholders through appropriate governance
mechanisms and meaningful dialogue that promote a socially and
environmentally responsible production of these resources locally,
while also looking for macro-level beneﬁts associated to energy
security and economic competitiveness.
The premises presented in this paper attempted to advance a
common reference framework for the analysis and comparison of
shale gas development around the world, and while this frame-
work is only an initial approximation to capture the complexity
surrounding shale gas development, it provides an interdisciplinary
perspective with generic characteristics that ascertain the key
domains and interactions involved, as well as those lying beyond
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ts control. The insights and empirical cases presented highlight
he study of shale gas development as a fertile ﬁeld for the con-
ergence of several disciplines, with robust opportunities for an
nlarged participation of social sciences. Hopefully, this study will
nstill more research that reﬁnes the framework’s premises, in par-
icular in countries other than the ones presented here, especially in
hose which have banned this activity. Ultimately, this paper could
elp policy-makers and countries across the world to understand
he risks underlying shale gas development, and to devise more
nclusive strategies with balanced governance approaches in those
ases where political will is favorable to such goal.
cknowledgment
The author expresses his deepest gratitude to three anony-
ous referees whose thorough and valuable insights improved this
aper.
eferences
[1] R. Aguilera, M.  Radetzki, The shale revolution: global gas and oil markets
under transformation, Miner. Econ. 26 (3) (2014) 75–84.
[2] R.F. Aguilera, R.D. Ripple, R. Aguilera, Link between endowments: economics
and  environment in conventional and unconventional gas reservoirs, Fuel 126
(2014) 224–238.
[3] F. Al-Kasim, Managing Petroleum Resources. The ‘Norwegian Model’ in a
Broad Perspective, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2006.
[4] P. Andrews-Speed, R. Bleischwitz, T. Boersma, C. Johnson, G. Kemp, S.D.
Vandeveer, Want, Waste or War? The Global Resource Nexus and the Struggle
for  Land, Energy, Food, Water and Minerals, Routledge, New York, 2015.
[5] P. Andrews-Speed, C. Len, The legal and commercial determinants of
unconventional gas production in East Asia, J. World Energy Law Bus. 7 (5)
(2014) 408–422.
[6] APERC (Asia Paciﬁc Energy Research Centre), Pathways to Shale Gas
Development [Online], Asia Paciﬁc Energy Research Centre, Tokyo, 2015.
[7] M.  Binnion, How the technical differences between shale gas and
conventional gas projects lead to a new business model being required to be
successful, Mar. Petrol. Geol. 31 (1) (2012) 3–7.
[8] E. Bomberg, Shale we  drill? Discourse dynamic in UK fracking debates, J.
Environ. Policy Plann. (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.
1053111.
[9] T.J. Centner, L.K. O’Connell, Unﬁnished business in the regulation of shale gas
production in the United States, Sci. Total Environ. 476–477 (2014) 359–367.
10] C.R. Clarkson, J.L. Jensen, S. Chipperﬁeld, Unconventional gas reservoir
evaluation: what do we  have to consider? J. Nat. Gas Sci. Eng. 8 (2012) 9–33.
11] M.  Cotton, I. Rattle, J. Van Alstine, Shale gas policy in the United Kingdom: an
argumentative discourse analysis, Energy Policy 73 (2014) 427–438.
12] J.B. Curtis, Fractured shale-gas systems, AAPG Bull. 86 (11) (2002) 1921–1938.
13] A. De la Vega Navarro, J. Ramírez Villegas, El gas de lutitas (shale gas) en
México Recursos, explotación, usos impactos, Econ. UNAM 12 (34) (2015)
79–105.
14] P. Deemer, N. Song, China’s ‘Long March’ to shale gas production-exciting
potential and lost opportunities, J. World Energy Bus. 7 (5) (2014) 448–467.
15] EIA (Energy Information Administration), World Shale Gas Resources: an
Initial Assessment of 14 Regions Outside the United States, United States
Energy Information Administration, Washington, 2011.
16] EIA (Energy Information Administration), Technically Recoverable Shale Oil
and Shale Gas Resource: an Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41
Countries Outside the United States, U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Washington, 2013.
17] El Financiero, Postergan Ronda 1.5 Para áreas No Convencionales [Online],
2016, Available at: http://www.elﬁnanciero.com.mx/economia/postergan-
ronda-para-areas-no-convencionales.html (accessed 08.05.16).
18] K.H. Garvie, K. Shaw, Shale gas development and community response:
perspectives from Treaty 8 territory, British Columbia, Local Environ. (2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2015.1063043.
19] A. Goldthau, Rethinking the governance of energy infrastructure: scale,
decentralization and polycentrism, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 1 (2014) 134–140.
20] M.  Guarnone, F. Rossi, E. Negri, C. Grassi, D. Genazzi, R. Zennaro, An
unconventional mindset for shale gas surface facilities, J. Nat. Gas Sci. Eng. 6
(2012) 14–23.
21] N. Gunningham, A shale gas revolution for China, Clim. Policy 14 (2013)
302–320.
22] J. Hays, M.L. Finkel, M.  Depledge, A. Law, S.B.C. Shonkoff, Considerations for
the development of shale gas in the United Kingdom, Sci. Total Environ.
512–513 (2015) 36–42.
23] C. Hilson, Framing fracking: which frames are heard in English planning and
environmental policy and practice, J. Environ. Law 27 (2015) 177–202.
24] R. Holahan, G. Arnold, An institutional theory of hydraulic fracturing policy,
Ecol. Econ. 94 (2013) 127–134.
[ Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72 71
25] M.  Hulbert, A. Goldthau, Natural gas going global? Potential and pitfalls, in: A.
Goldthau (Ed.), The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, Wiley-Blackwell, West
Sussex, 2013, pp. 98–112.
26] D. Hu, S. Xu, Opportunity, challenges and policy choices for China on the
development of shale gas, Energy Policy 60 (2013) 21–26.
27] R.B. Jackson, A. Vengosh, W.  Carey, R.J. Davies, T.H. Darrah, F. O’Sullivan, G.
Pétron, The environmental costs and beneﬁts of fracking, Annu. Rev. Environ.
Resour. 39 (2014) 327–362.
28] C. Johnson, T. Boersma, Energy (in)security in Poland the case of shale gas,
Energy Policy 53 (2013) 389–399.
29] A. Krupnick, Z. Wang, Y. Wang, Environmental risks of shale gas development
in China, Energy Policy 75 (2014) 117–125.
30] M.  LaBelle, A. Goldthau, Escaping the valley of death? Comparing shale gas
technology prospects to nuclear and solar in Europe, J. World Energy Law Bus.
7  (2) (2014) 93–111.
31] A. Lajous, Mexican Oil Reform: The First Two Bidding Rounds, Farmouts and
Contractual Conversions in a Lower Oil Price Environment, Columbia SIPA
Center on Global Energy Policy, New York, 2015.
32] A.M. Larson, F. Soto, Decentralization of natural resource governance regimes,
Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 33 (2008) 213–239.
33] J.R. Lozano Maya, The United States experience as a reference of success for
shale gas development: the case of Mexico, Energy Policy 62 (2013) 70–78.
34] J. Martínez de Hoz, T. Lanardonne, A. Máculus, Shale we dance an
unconventional tango? J. World Energy Law Bus. 6 (3) (2013) 179–209.
35] M.C. Moore, An Energy Strategy for Canada, University of Calgary—The School
of  Public Policy, Calgary, 2015.
36] M.H. Nederlof, The scope for natural gas supplies from unconventional
sources, Annu. Rev. Energy 13 (1988) 95–117.
37] D.W. North, P.C. Stern, T. Webler, P. Field, Public and stakeholder participation
for managing and reducing the risks of shale gas development, Environ. Sci.
Technol. 48 (2014) 8388–8396.
38] G.M. Nülle, Prospects for shale development outside the USA: evaluating
nations’ regulatory and ﬁscal regimes for unconventional hydrocarbons, J.
World Energy Law Bus. 8 (3) (2015) 232–268.
39] Oil and Gas Journal, BP, CNPC Ink Chinese Shale Gas PSC [Online], 2016,
Available at: http://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/03/bp-cnpc-ink-chinese-
shale-gas-psc.html (accessed 01.05.16).
40] E. Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2005.
41] J. Prno, D.S. Slocombe, Exploring the origins of ‘social license to operate’ in the
mining sector: perspectives from governance and sustainability theories,
Resour. Policy 37 (2012) 346–357.
42] C. Rivard, D. Lavoie, R. Lefebvre, S. Séjourné, C. Lamontagne, M. Duchesne, An
overview of Canadian shale gas production and environmental concerns, Int.
J.  Coal Geol. 126 (2014) 64–76.
43] S.L. Sakmar, The Global Shale Gas Initiative: will the United States be the role
model for the development of shale gas around the world? Houst. J. Int. Law
33  (2) (2011) 369–417.
44] Seelke, C., Villarreal, M., Ratner, M.,  Brown, P., 2015. Mexico’s oil and gas
sector: Background, reform efforts and the implications for the United States.
Congressional Research Service.
45] K. Shaw, S.D. Hill, A.D. Boyd, L. Monk, J. Reid, E.F. Einsiedel, Conﬂicted or
constructive? Exploring community responses to new energy developments
in  Canada, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 8 (2015) 41–51.
46] A. Shuen, P.F. Feiler, D.J. Teece, Dynamic capabilities in the upstream oil and
gas  sector: managing next generation competition, Energy Strategy Rev. 3
(2014) 5–13.
47] M.  Small, P. Stern, E. Bomberg, S. Christopherson, B. Goldstein, A. Israel, R.
Jackson, A. Krupnick, M. Mauter, J. Nash, D. North, S. Olmstead, A. Prakash, B.
Rabe, N. Richardson, S. Tierney, T. Webler, G. Wong-Parodi, B. Zielinska, Risks
and risk governance in unconventional shale gas development, Environ. Sci.
Technol. 48 (2014) 8289–8297.
48] B.K. Sovacool, An international comparison of four polycentric approaches to
climate and energy governance, Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3282–3844.
49] B.K. Sovacool, Cornucopia or curse? Reviewing the costs and beneﬁts of shale
gas  hydraulic fracturing (fracking), Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 37 (2014)
249–264.
50] B.K. Sovacool, What are we doing here? Analyzing ﬁfteen years of energy
scholarship and proposing a social science research agenda, Energy Res. Soc.
Sci. 1 (2014) 1–29.
51] B.K. Sovacool, S.E. Ryan, P.C. Stern, K. Janda, G. Rochlin, D. Spreng, M.J.
Pasqualetti, H. Wilhite, L. Lutzenhiser, Integrating social science in energy
research, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 6 (2015) 95–99.
52] B.K. Sovacool, V. Vivoda, Enhancing the energy security and governance of
shale gas Oil, Gas Energy Law Intell. 12 (3) (2014) 1–35.
53] P. Stevens, The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and Reality, Chatham House,
London, 2010.
54] L. Tian, Z. Wang, A. Krupnick, X. Liu, Stimulating shale gas development in
China: a comparison with the US experience, Energy Policy 75 (2014)
109–116.
55] F. Umbach, The unconventional gas revolution and the prospects for Europe
and Asia, Asia Eur. J. 11 (3) (2013) 305–322.
56] G. Walker, P. Devine-Wright, J. Barnett, K. Burningham, N. Cass, H.
Devine-Wright, G. Speller, J. Barton, B. Evans, Y. Heath, D. Inﬁeld, J. Parks, K.
Theobald, Symmetries, expectations, dynamics and contexts: a framework for
understanding public engagement with renewable energy projects, in: P.
7 rch &
[
[
[
[
[
[
[63] Z. Xingang, K. Jiaoli, L. Bei, Focus on the development of shale gas in2 J.R. Lozano-Maya / Energy Resea
Devine-Wright (Ed.), Renewable Energy and the Public: From NIMBY to
Participation, Earthscan, New York, 2011, pp. 1–14.
57] Z. Wan, T. Huang, B. Craig, Barriers to the development of China’s shale gas
industry, J. Clean. Prod. 84 (2014) 818–823.
58] Q. Wang, X. Chen, J. Awadesh, H. Rogers, Natural gas from shale
formation—the evolution, evidences and challenges of shale gas revolution in
the  United States, Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 30 (2014) 1–28.59] Q. Wang, R. Li, Natural gas from shale formation: a research proﬁle, Renew.
Sustain. Energy Rev. 57 (2016) 1–6.
60] Z. Wang, A. Krupnick, A Retrospective Review of Shale Gas Development in
the United States. What Led to the Boom? Resources for the Future Resources
for the Future, Washington, D.C, 2013.
[ Social Science 20 (2016) 63–72
61] L. Whitmarsh, N. Nash, P. Upham, A. Lloyd, J. Verdon, M.  Kendall, UK public
perceptions of shale gas hydraulic fracturing: the role of audience: message
and contextual factors on risk perceptions and policy support Appl. Energy
160 (2015) 419–430.
62] H.J. Wiseman, The capacity of States to govern shale gas development risks,
Environ. Sci. Technol. 48 (2014) 8376–8387.China—based on SWOT analysis, Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 21 (2013)
603–613.
64] J. Yuan, D. Luo, L. Xia, L. Feng, Policy recommendations to promote shale gas
development in China, Energy Policy 85 (2015) 194–206.
